What I wish the U.S. had done about Putin years ago – And what Biden should do now

What I wish the U.S. had done about Putin years ago – And what Biden should do now

Photo: Patrick Semansky – AP

 

The U.S. has long avoided punishing the Russian leader in the misplaced hopes of cooperating with a regime that only seeks instability.

By Político – David J. Kramer

Sep 4, 2021

Fifteen years ago, I was working in the State Department when a prominent Russian journalist and a high-profile critic of Russian President Vladimir Putin were brutally murdered within a few weeks of each other, almost certainly by elements of the Russian security services. Our failure (my own included) to respond meaningfully to those murders is one of my biggest regrets.





Few realized in 2006 that the deaths of Anna Politkovskaya and Alexander Litvinenko were a canary in the coalmine for how Putin would deal with critics and perceived enemies. Of course, the former KGB officer had overseen a brutal invasion of Chechnya that claimed thousands of lives. But the murder of Litvinenko in particular, which took place in the U.K., showed Putin’s readiness to wipe out perceived threats even if located in other countries.

The situation has deteriorated since, with Putin overseeing the worst crackdown on Russia’s opposition, media and civil society since the Soviet era, including the assassination of opposition leader Boris Nemtsov in 2015 and the poisoning of Alexei Navalny in 2020. Despite a stagnant economy and the coronavirus pandemic, Putin maintains a firm grip on power, at least for now, by eliminating domestic opposition, removing term limits through rigged constitutional changes and propping up like-minded leaders in the region (Belarus’ dictator, Alexander Lukashenko, for example) and beyond (Syria, Cuba, Venezuela).

It is possible the administration has retaliated covertly. But the lack of public response – which seems to encourage Putin to do nothing to stop the attacks – continues the unfortunate mistakes of the past three administrations.

Indeed, the U.S.-Russian relationship over the past 15 years is littered with examples of American failure to hold Putin accountable and impose penalties that would induce him to alter his behavior. This is in part because U.S. policymakers have consistently failed to see Putin as a true threat who will only stop when faced with serious pushback. It also reflects a desire across administrations to minimize the risk of escalation with Russia. Finally, America’s cautious posture is rooted in concern about jeopardizing prospects for cooperation in other areas, like arms control, Afghanistan, Iran and climate change.

But the reality is that we are likely to get very little cooperation from the Putin regime. Instead, “playing nice” with Putin plays right into his playbook. While Biden may seek “predictability and stability” in the U.S.-Russia relationship, Putin’s end goal is precisely to stir up as much instability as possible. He has used hybrid warfare and outright invasion to destabilize neighbors like Ukraine and Georgia to try to make them unattractive candidates for membership in NATO and/or the European Union. He does not want to see thriving democracies along Russia’s borders that could pose threatening alternatives to the authoritarian model he has constructed. Every time the West responds weakly or not at all, he pushes even further with his destabilization efforts. On Afghanistan – the Biden administration’s most urgent foreign policy crisis at the moment and an area where the U.S. might be tempted to seek Russian cooperation – Putin reportedly brushed off a request from Biden during the leaders’ June summit to allow U.S. bases in Central Asia.

Today, I’d advise Biden to avoid the mistakes of his predecessors and to instead take the tougher approach that seemed to be his instinct early in his presidency. Hoping Putin will just go away so the administration can focus on China or, worse, that he can be channeled in a more positive direction ignores the lessons of the past 15 years. This will only lead to more regrets down the road.

Today, I’d advise Biden to avoid the mistakes of his predecessors and to instead take the tougher approach that seemed to be his instinct early in his presidency. Hoping Putin will just go away so the administration can focus on China or, worse, that he can be channeled in a more positive direction ignores the lessons of the past 15 years. This will only lead to more regrets down the road.

In the fall of 2006, I was the deputy assistant secretary of state for Europe and Eurasia with responsibility for Russia, Ukraine, Belarus and Moldova. Putin was halfway through his second term. Initially, relations with the United States got off to a decent start — Putin was the first foreign leader to contact President George W. Bush after the 9/11 attacks — and the two men developed a rapport.

But with Russia rebounding from the chaos of the 1990s, thanks to the spike in oil prices, Putin accelerated his campaign of marginalizing or even eliminating perceived threats, such as former oligarch Mikhail Khodorkovsky, arrested in 2003.

On Oct. 7, 2006 (which happens to be Putin’s birthday), journalist Anna Politkovskaya, who exposed corruption and wrongdoing by the Putin regime, was gunned down in her Moscow apartment building. While several men were arrested and tried for her murder, nobody has been arrested for having ordered it. Since then, more than 20 Russian journalists have been killed.

Less than a month later, Russian agents traveled to London and poisoned the tea of Alexander Litvinenko, a former Russian spy who had turned against Putin. He died an excruciatingly painful death three weeks later. A British public inquiry concluded that Andrey Lugovoy and Dmitry Kovtun had killed Litvinenko with polonium, a dangerous and banned radioactive substance — and that Putin “probably” approved of the murder. Instead of being held accountable, Lugovoy became a member of the Russian parliament.

In neither case did the U.K., EU or United States impose any sanctions. Despite growing awareness within the Bush administration that Putin was establishing a kleptocratic authoritarian state that could pose serious challenges, we continued to try to find areas of cooperation. Entering its final two years in office, the White House hoped to keep relations with Moscow cordial and even find common ground on contentious issues. We thought we could minimize the growing differences on missile defense, NATO enlargement, recognition of Kosovo independence and human rights. But neither the State Department nor the Pentagon, which tended to be more hawkish, had a similarly hopeful perspective.

Read More: Político – What I wish the U.S. had done about Putin years ago – And what Biden should do now

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